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Rules 24 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant ("Genovesi") files this Reply
Brief in response to the Appellee's Brief, which raises new issues.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant facts have pi t
opening briefs.

ctive

ARGUMENT
POINT I
GENOVESI ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
HIS OBJECTION TO THE SEARCHES CONDUCTED AT HIS
RESIDENCE.
The State characterizes as "niggling attacks," Appellee Br. at 15, Genovesi's
attempt to comply with this Court's oft-stated requirement that a party challenging findings of
fact must marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate the insufficiency of
the evidence even when viewed in the light most favorable to the decision. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Ironically, the State's response
brief is a catalogue of pettiness and an attempt to side-step the real issues before this Court. A
significant portion of the State's brief is devoted to contending that Genovesi "waives" this or
that right, or did not demonstrate "plain error", or failed to thoroughly comply with procedural
rules. E.g., "Genovesi had not timely and clearly . . . challenge [the] March 20 search"
(Appellee Br. at 16); Genovesi's supporting memorandum and oral argument in the district court
touched upon scope-of-consent analysis but was insufficiently detailed (Appellee Br. at 31);
"Genovesi does not specifically ask that his conviction be reversed" (Appellee Br. at 36).
The State engaged in this charade knowing fully well that Genovesi "challenged
the searches conducted at his residence" in the district court and in this Court. See Apellant's
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Br. at 8-17.1

Therefore, contrary to the State's assertion, Genovesi took no comfort in

painstakingly demonstrating the inadequacy of the district court's findings. Further, it is clear
that the issues raised in Genovesi's opening brief were properly preserved for appellate review.
See Appellant's Br. at 1-3. And Genovesi asked, in the alternative, that those issues arguably
not preserved be reviewed for plain error. See id. & p. 12.

POINT n
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED FROM THE
GENOVESI RESIDENCE WAS HARMFUL.
A. Erroneous Admission of Evidence Was Harmful Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The State urges this Court to abandon the harmless error standard long-utilized
by the United States Supreme Court with respect to erroneous admission at trial of illegally
obtained evidence.

This harmlessness standard requires the proponent of the evidence to

demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or suffer appellate reversal.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970).
The State believes, however, that the Supreme Court and other courts have been
utilizing the wrong harmlessness standard. Accordingly, the State invites this Court to abandon
that standard and shift the burden to the opponent of the evidence to demonstrate that, absent

1

Inspite of the State's litigation posture in this Court, Genovesi is confident that the issues
raised in his brief will not disappear and will have to be tackled by the State, later if not now.
See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b).
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the error, there is a more reasonable likelihood of a more favorable verdict. See Appellee Br.
at 33-34.
It is quite understandable that the State prefers the less rigorous "reasonable
likelihood" harmless error standard. See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 n.12 (Utah 1989)
(harmless error standard for non-constitutional errors "is not as strict as the federal constitutional
[harmless error] standard."), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). However, the principle of
stare decisis, "a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence" "under which the first decision
by a court on a particular question of law governs later decisions," State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256, 1269 (Utah 1993), should temper the State's preference and obviate the need to relitigate
the harmlessness standard applicable to erroneous admission of illegally obtained evidence.
Whether a judgment of conviction should be affirmed in the face of a violation
of a federal constitutional right, that is, the question of harmlessness of an error, is governed
by federal law.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).

For stare decisis

purposes, since the Supreme Court, and universally every court that has examined the issue,
have on numerous occasions held that erroneous admission of illegally obtained evidence
requires the proponent to show the strict harmless error standard, see, e.g. Chambers, 399 U.S.
at 52; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968), the State's preference for a less
rigorous standard is immaterial. Accordingly, contrary to the State's assertion that the issue has
not been resolved, the question of which harmless error analysis applies to illegally seized
evidence has been definitively answered by the Supreme Court. See LaFave, Search and Seizure:
-4-

A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.7(e), at 527-59 (2d ed. 1987). See, e.g., Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970). Thus, this Court Mcannot declare federal constitutional
error harmless unless [it] sincerely believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Scott v. State, 86 Nev. 145, 465 P.2d 620, 622 (1970) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18).
Accord Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1213.
In attempting to show that the evidence Genovesi challenges was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, the State urges this Court to look at "other" evidence admitted against him
to determine whether there was "overwhelming" guilt. See Appellee Br. at 38-40. The Supreme
Court has, however, cautioned against such an end-run around the Constitution. In Chapman,
the Court recognized that "harmless error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results"
unless narrowly employed.

386 U.S. at 22.

Thus, not only did the Court require the

beneficiary of the error to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, it left no doubt that
the beneficiary must show that the error made no contribution to the criminal conviction. See
id. at 26. By adopting the overwhelming evidence test proposed by the State, this Court would
impermissibly allow "mischievious results" that Chapman cautioned against. See id. at 22.
The question in this case boils down to whether this Court can confidently,
sincerely say that the evidence erroneously admitted against Genovesi made no contribution to
his conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. The answer clearly is "no." It is widely recognized
that, unlike other type of evidence, physical evidence of the type admitted against Genovesi tend
to inflame the jury against a criminal defendant. Accordingly, courts are apt to decline to find
-5-

harmless error when physical evidence was erroneously admitted.

See, e.g., Stoner v.

California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 n.8 (1964) (erroneously admitted physical evidence improperly
influenced jury by supporting credibility of state witnesses and undermining credibility of
defense witnesses); see generally LaFave, § 11.7(e), at 531-32.
The State relies significantly on the medical examiner's explanation that the
injuries suffered by the child-victim do not normally occur from accidental falls as theorized by
the defense.

According to the State, the medical examiner's testimony constitutes

"overwhelming independent evidence" of Genovesi's guilt. Therefore, as the argument goes,
Genovesi's conviction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Appellee Br. at 40-41.

Slippery-slope arguments of this sort have consistently been frowned upon by the
Supreme Court, however. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22-26; Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490. In
Stoner, the Supreme Court noted that physical evidence normally has the tendency of boosting
the credibility of state witnesses and resolving conflicting testimony in the latter's favor.
Because the evidence in Stoner was illegally seized and then erroneously admitted, the Court
held that "[t]here is thus at least 'a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction.'" Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490 n.8 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963)). Accordingly, the Court found the error harmful. See id.
In this case, the State, astonishingly, trivialized the impact of the physical
evidence, such as the hair from the dented wall, carpet and photographs of the bunk beds,
admitted against Genovesi. See Appellee Br. at 38. The State would have this Court believe,
-6-

for example, that evidence of hair piece on a dented wall made no significant contribution to
buttressing the testimony of the medical examiner that the child-victim must have been thrown
from three stories' height and did not accidentally fall. Phrased differently, the State asks this
Court to find that the physical evidence did not undermine the defense theory of accidental fall
and made no contribution to the conviction.

That argument is without merit and should

summarily be rejected as irreconcilable with Stoner and its progeny. There is no doubt that the
jury gave considerable credence to the examiner's testimony in part, if not mainly, because of
the supporting, albeit erroneously admitted, physical evidence. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490 n.8.
In summary, the State has not demonstrated (and cannot demonstrate) that the error in admitting
the evidence against Genovesi was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IL

Even Under the Non-Constitutional Harmless Error Standard. Genovesi
Would Not Have Been Convicted Absent the Erroneously Admitted
Evidence.

In advocating for a less rigorous harmless error standard, the State faults Genovesi
for not showing, in this and his prior appeal, ,fany likelihood of a more favorable trial verdict
had the home search been suppressed." Appellee Br. at 36.

With its ample and infinite

resources, the State has the luxury to engage in errant discourse; Genovesi, on the other hand,
is not so blessed. The burden regarding harmlessness of federal constitutional errors, since at
least 1963, is for the proponent of the evidence to bear.

See Fahy, 375 U.S. at 85-88;

Chapman, 368 U.S. at 18-24. See generally State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989).
As such, in his first appeal to this Court, Genovesi saw no reason to shift onto himself the
-7-

burden of proving harmlessness, let alone bear the burden of demonstrating harmlessness under
a standard applicable only to non-constitutional errors. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 12022 (Utah 1989) (non-constitutional error requires defendant to show there is reasonable
likelihood of different outcome absent error).
Nor has the harmless constitutional error rule changed: the burden remains on the
State to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Williamson, 114 S.
Ct. 2431, 2438 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); State v. Villarreal, _ P.2d _ , 256 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27, 30 (Utah 1995). Again, Genovesi saw no need to raise harmless error in his
second appeal or carry the burden of proving no error. Accordingly, the State's complaint that
Genovesi chose not to shoulder the burden of demonstrating harmlessness is simply without
merit and another illustration of pettiness on the part of the State.
Even under the harmless error standard applicable to non-constitutional errors,
which clearly has no application to this case, see Point II (A), supra, there exists reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable verdict for Genovesi absent the error. See State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). "Reasonable
likelihood" has been interpreted to mean whether the reviewing court can say its confidence in
the outcome of the case is in no way eroded by the alleged error. See Knight, 1?>4 P. 2d at 920.
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must
be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. . . .If it is
"more probable than not" that the outcome of the trial would have been
different, then a court cannot possibly place confidence in the verdict.
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Id. In other words, the reasonable likelihood test "focuses on the taint caused by the error. If
the taint is sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support the
verdict/ Mitchell, 779 P.2d at 1122.
As earlier stated, the State erroneously focuses on the untainted evidence admitted
against Genovesi; at the same time, it attempted to trivialize the tainted physical evidence.
However, there is no doubt that evidence of hair piece on a dented wall made a significant
contribution to buttressing the testimony of the medical examiner that the child-victim must have
been thrown from three stories' height. As the Supreme Court once held, evidence of this type
is more likely to influence the decision of the jury. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490. Absent the
evidence, there exists sufficient likelihood that Genovesi would not have been convicted. See
Mitchell, 779P.2dat 1122.
CONCLUSION
Genovesi urges this Court to consider all the issues raised his opening brief and
reverse the judgment of the district court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1995.

BRADLEY P. RICH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

HAKEEM ISHOLA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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day of July, 1993, to Janet C. Graham, Utah Attorney General,

and J. Kevin Murphy, Asst. Attorney General, 235 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84114.
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